After the death of their ideologue, Ibn Yasin, in 1059, the Almoravids ceased to be simply a reform movement bent on religious proselytism and gradually took the shape of a dynastic state. The loose ties that kept the movement together were replaced by new political alliances between the Almoravid leadership and subject groups, such as non-Sanhaja Berbers and Andalusian Muslims. The power structure of the nascent state was hierarchical; it contrasted greatly with the absence of a centralized authority and lack of tribal cohesion that characterized the formative period of the movement. Political power was monopolized by Lamtuna chiefs from whose ranks both rulers (known as emirs) and court dignitaries were selected. The title of murabit (Almoravid) was reserved for members of the three constituent communities of the movement: the Lamtuna, Guddala, and Massufa, who filled the Main administrative posts. The bottom echelons were occupied by tribes such as the Jazula and Lamta that, though grudgingly at first, had finally embraced the Almoravid reformist program. They formed the backbone of the army and were known as “the followers” (al-hasham).
The rise of Yusuf ibn Tashfin to political prominence was somehow fortuitous. While Abu Bakr bin ’Umar, nominal ruler, was busy trying to bring restive tribes in the south back to the fold, Yusuf had served as his deputy, actually in absolute charge of the territories north of the High Atlas. Aware that any attempt to oppose Yusuf’s political ambitions would result in the fragmentation of the state, Abu Bakr decided to abdicate in favor of his protege in 1072.
Most of the Almoravid conquests took place during Yusuf’s reign (1061-1107). Marrakech, the new capital founded by Abu Bakr in 1070 because of its strategic location, constituted an ideal springboard for future campaigns in the north. Fez was taken in 1075 and the occupation of the Rif, the mountain range that runs parallel to the Mediterranean coast, was completed within less than a decade. Although Almoravid troops reached the mountains of Kabylia, the extent of their rule did not go beyond present-day Oran, in western Algeria. Ceuta, taken in 1083, served as the gateway to the annexation of the Iberian Peninsula (Al-Andalus).
Yusuf ibn Tashfin is favorably portrayed in Muslim sources. The fact that he abstained from adopting the title of amir al-mu’minin (XXXX, theoretically reserved for the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad), thus avoiding a religious schism in Sunni Islam, enhanced his reputation among contemporary chroniclers as a pious and selfless ruler. The adoption of Malikism as the state legal doctrine was also one of Yusuf’s main policies. At his behest, Maliki scholars were allocated official stipends and granted numerous privileges, such as access to his privy council. The monopoly exerted by Maliki jurists (fuqaha’) over legal matters is often regarded as a mixed blessing by later authors. The existence of an officially sponsored school of law helped homogenize legal proceedings in a vast geographical area that included Muslim Spain and North Africa. It gave too much power, however, to a single category of legal experts, thus opening the way to nepotism, abuse of office, and other pernicious practices commonly associated with corporate-like institutions. Reliance on a single legal code is blamed, moreover, for the “intellectual impoverishment” and rigidity that, according to most modern scholars, marked the Almoravid period. The excessive use of manuals of legal casuistry (furu') and the subsequent neglect of the traditional sources of Islamic law (Qur’an and prophetic traditions), a propensity to follow existing legal precedents (taqlid) rather than exercise individual powers of jurisprudence (ijtihad), and, finally, the use of literal Qur’anic exegesis even when the latter might engender anthropomorphic views, are some of the most frequentlymentioned signs of this alleged ideological decline.
The influence of Maliki jurists became even more overpowering during the reign of Yusuf’s successor, ‘Ali ibn Yusuf ibn Tashfin (1107-1143). Although his asceticism and piety are not in dispute, chroniclers are unanimous in their portrayal of this ruler as a wellmeaning but cowardly monarch, unfortunate enough to be faced with the task of tackling three simultaneous dangers: the resurgence of the Christian kingdoms in Spain (a constant drain in terms of financial and military resources), the rebellion of Ibn Tumart from 1125 onward, and the increasing stranglehold of the Maliki establishment on the Almoravid state. The surge of military activity in Al-Andalus forced ‘Ali ibn Yusuf to increase the amount of troops dispatched there and to impose dubious taxes on his Maghribi subjects. This latter measure caused considerable discontent and it was viewed as a betrayal of the Almoravid programme of abolishing non-Qur’anic taxes. To compound matters, military shortages in Morocco were offset by recruiting Christian mercenaries. This unpopular decision benefited the Almohads, Ibn Tumart’s followers, as it confirmed their claims that the ruling elite no longer enjoyed religious legitimacy. Almohad pressure became ever more intense and the walls of Marrakesh had to be reinforced in 1129.
Among the criticisms against ‘Ali ibn Yusuf’s rule, none seems more damaging than his incapacity to rein in the excesses of the Maliki legal establishment. Jurists took advantage of their position to extract more privileges and financial perks from the Almoravid court. Although anti-Maliki propaganda must be treated with caution, it seems certain that some judiciary-instigated measures such as the ban on Al-Ghazali’s mystical works, the official clampdown on Sufi circles and, more generally, the endorsement of heavy fiscal policies caused widespread popular discontent.
‘Ali ibn Yusuf spent most of the second half of his reign (from 1125 to his death in 1143) combating both the Christians of the Iberian Peninsula and the fledgling Almohad movement. A series of military setbacks in Spain weakened the Almoravid army. This, coupled with growing restiveness among the populace due to heavy taxation, explains his inability to subdue the Almohad rebels before they were numerically superior. His two successors, Tashfin (1143-1145) and Ishaq (1145-1147), inherited a kingdom that would inevitably disappear.
Francisco Rodriguez-Manas See also: ‘Abd Allah ibn Yasin: Almoravid: Sahara.
Further Reading
Abun-Nasr, J. M. A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period. Cambridge, 1987.
Laroui, A. The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1977.
Norris, H. T. The Berbers in Arabic Literature. London, 1982.
Yusuf Pasha Karamanli: See Libya: Yusuf Pasha Karamanli and the Ottoman Reoccupation, 1795-1835.
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